'We are up against a people who think...They invented and successfully promoted socialism, communism, human rights and democracy so that persecuting them would appear to be wrong, so they may enjoy equal rights with others.'
- Dr Mahathir on Jews. Straits Times, Oct 17th
Well, it seems that there are at least some people who hold seriously the view of slave morality. But how do assertian that this is indeed a historical fact? How do you prove that socialism, communism, human rights and democracy really originated with the Jews? Is etymology really enough?
Some Arguments against Etymology
The fact that etymological arguments are today not employed in philosophy is a strong indication of the fact that such lines of arguments are weak. Nietzsche conclusion that Schuld [guilt] is derived from Schulden [debt] appears to rely on similarity of sound and is at best only circumstantial evidence that their original meanings were such. His etymological evidence does not seem to have been corroborated by anyone else. He further undermines his own evidence by saying in GM I 13 that the ‘seduction of language’ can make a force appear otherwise . Surely language shifts and adopts new meanings over time. Some terms acquire meanings totally opposite from the original. For example, we all know 'gay' has taken on a meaning totally different from its original, yet they do now have any significant logical or historical connection. A person making such etymological studies must therefore be very careful not to make connections where there are not any, and I am not convinced that Nietzsche did not make such an error.
While Nietzsche, as a philologist, provides examples several examples in many languages, he crucially left out certain Asian conceptions of morality. For example, Zen Buddhist and Confucian morality appear to be descended from nature and society respectively, and not from nobility. I believe that Nietzsche will find it hard to show any history of a slave morality inverting the values of a noble morality, and even if he did, such morality (such as Buddhist ascetic value) surely did not come from the Jewish tradition.
The biggest objection however, is that even if morality did arise from certain historical scenarios, it does not follow that these moralities are false. The weakness of the argument from etymology is of course the move from ‘morality is malleable’ to ‘there is no absolute morality’. A Christian, for example, can still hold that Christian morality is true because it is based on a revelation from God (The etymology of the word 'Good' according to Webster is from the old english 'gOd'). At best then, Nietzshe's analysis must be viewed as simply an alternative thesis on the origin of morality. Because I have not come across other etymological studies comparing these competing accounts, I am unable to say if Nietzsche's etymological analysis is permissable for
Together, I feel that the argument from etymology is considerably weak. However, Nietzsche does not claim that his analysis is objective fact. Perhaps he just meant the argument to support his view that all morality is only intepretations (his perspecitvism). If this were the case, then we must read his arguments from etymology in that light and not any other.
Friday, October 17, 2003
Thursday, October 02, 2003
Essay Topic
I must say that On the Genealogy of Morals is the best read so far for me of Nietzsche’s works. It’s got arguments! The exhilaration! The epiphany!
Anyway, the topic I wish to explore is ‘Is the genealogy of morals a morally relativist concept?’
The passage that inspires this topic is actually the footnote to Book One of GM:
Note. I take the opportunity provided by this treatise to express publicly and formally a desire I have previously voiced only in occasional conversation with scholars; namely, that some philosophical faculty might advance historical studies of morality through a series of academic prize-essays—perhaps this present book will serve to provide a powerful impetus in this direction. In case this idea should be implemented, I suggest the following question: it deserves the attention of philologists and historians as well as that of professional philosophers:
"What light does linguistics, and especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of moral concepts?"
On the other hand, it is equally necessary to engage the interest of physiologists and doctors in these problems (of the value of existing evaluations); it may be left to academic philosophers to act as advocates and mediators in this matter too, after they have on the whole succeeded in the past in transforming the originally so reserved and mistrustful relations between philosophy, physiology, and medicine into the most amicable and fruitful exchange. Indeed, every table of values, every "thou shalt" known to history or ethnology, requires first a physiological investigation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and every one of them needs a critique on the part of medical science. The question: what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"? should be viewed from the most divers perspectives; for the problem "value for what?" cannot be examined too subtly. Something, for example, that possessed obvious value in relation to the longest possible survival of a race (or to the enhancement of its power of adaptation to a particular climate or to the reservation of the greatest number) would by no means possess the same value if it were a question, for instance, of producing a stronger type. The well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value: to consider the former a priori of higher value may be left to the naïveté of English biologists.— All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values.
First, Nietzsche believes that a philosophical inquiry into the History of Morality is possible. At the same time, the project will need philologists, historians, and doctors. What does this mean for Nietzsche’s conception of morality? Does this mean that all the historical-relativistic shades of morality can be stripped away through inquiry to reveal its core? He seems to suggest this when he speaks of Nobility being the first ‘good’. Is Nietzsche ultimately a realist about morals?
Or is Nietzsche a pragmatist about morals? After all, he says that Christian morality was good for a while, but now must be discarded because it has ceased to be helpful anymore. (note: I’m not sure what to quote to support this statement, as it was garnered from the discussion in class)
Most tellingly, I feel, is Nietzsche’s question “what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"?”. It implies very strongly that there is not one value or moral, but many tables of values and “morals”. This seems to show that Nietzsche is a relativist about morality. It is probably even compatible with the pragmatist. I thus wish to show that this actually is the case. Ultimately, I hope to elucidate Nietzsche’s conception of morality.
I must say that On the Genealogy of Morals is the best read so far for me of Nietzsche’s works. It’s got arguments! The exhilaration! The epiphany!
Anyway, the topic I wish to explore is ‘Is the genealogy of morals a morally relativist concept?’
The passage that inspires this topic is actually the footnote to Book One of GM:
Note. I take the opportunity provided by this treatise to express publicly and formally a desire I have previously voiced only in occasional conversation with scholars; namely, that some philosophical faculty might advance historical studies of morality through a series of academic prize-essays—perhaps this present book will serve to provide a powerful impetus in this direction. In case this idea should be implemented, I suggest the following question: it deserves the attention of philologists and historians as well as that of professional philosophers:
"What light does linguistics, and especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of moral concepts?"
On the other hand, it is equally necessary to engage the interest of physiologists and doctors in these problems (of the value of existing evaluations); it may be left to academic philosophers to act as advocates and mediators in this matter too, after they have on the whole succeeded in the past in transforming the originally so reserved and mistrustful relations between philosophy, physiology, and medicine into the most amicable and fruitful exchange. Indeed, every table of values, every "thou shalt" known to history or ethnology, requires first a physiological investigation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and every one of them needs a critique on the part of medical science. The question: what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"? should be viewed from the most divers perspectives; for the problem "value for what?" cannot be examined too subtly. Something, for example, that possessed obvious value in relation to the longest possible survival of a race (or to the enhancement of its power of adaptation to a particular climate or to the reservation of the greatest number) would by no means possess the same value if it were a question, for instance, of producing a stronger type. The well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value: to consider the former a priori of higher value may be left to the naïveté of English biologists.— All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values.
First, Nietzsche believes that a philosophical inquiry into the History of Morality is possible. At the same time, the project will need philologists, historians, and doctors. What does this mean for Nietzsche’s conception of morality? Does this mean that all the historical-relativistic shades of morality can be stripped away through inquiry to reveal its core? He seems to suggest this when he speaks of Nobility being the first ‘good’. Is Nietzsche ultimately a realist about morals?
Or is Nietzsche a pragmatist about morals? After all, he says that Christian morality was good for a while, but now must be discarded because it has ceased to be helpful anymore. (note: I’m not sure what to quote to support this statement, as it was garnered from the discussion in class)
Most tellingly, I feel, is Nietzsche’s question “what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"?”. It implies very strongly that there is not one value or moral, but many tables of values and “morals”. This seems to show that Nietzsche is a relativist about morality. It is probably even compatible with the pragmatist. I thus wish to show that this actually is the case. Ultimately, I hope to elucidate Nietzsche’s conception of morality.
Thursday, September 25, 2003
Live life by your own ends, or live life for the society?
Society values the virtue of selflessness, but in fact, selflessness is valued insofar as it serves as a means to other ends, which society actually values more. It is conceivable that if selfishness were to serve as a better instrument than selflessness in promoting the ends which society desires, then society would extol the selfish, instead of the selfless. -wh
In this post, Wenghong implies that society values some values more than others. Neitzsche, in SAE, seems to imply some sort of social darwinism when he says that "[m]ankind must work continually at the production of individual great men" and that "nothing else is its task". If Nietzsche considers this value this highest of society, the ultimate end of society, then presumably he would want every person to adopt this ends as a personal end. I do not think that he is just using such a shocking premise to make us consider for ourselves what our life's ends are. However, he doesn't seem to advance or support this point in his other passages. All we are left with is "How can [life] be least squandered? Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable exemplars ... ". That's all - a 'certainly'. Which leads me to think that he is either wrong, or changed his mind about this. Puzzling.
Society values the virtue of selflessness, but in fact, selflessness is valued insofar as it serves as a means to other ends, which society actually values more. It is conceivable that if selfishness were to serve as a better instrument than selflessness in promoting the ends which society desires, then society would extol the selfish, instead of the selfless. -wh
In this post, Wenghong implies that society values some values more than others. Neitzsche, in SAE, seems to imply some sort of social darwinism when he says that "[m]ankind must work continually at the production of individual great men" and that "nothing else is its task". If Nietzsche considers this value this highest of society, the ultimate end of society, then presumably he would want every person to adopt this ends as a personal end. I do not think that he is just using such a shocking premise to make us consider for ourselves what our life's ends are. However, he doesn't seem to advance or support this point in his other passages. All we are left with is "How can [life] be least squandered? Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable exemplars ... ". That's all - a 'certainly'. Which leads me to think that he is either wrong, or changed his mind about this. Puzzling.
Thursday, September 18, 2003
Thoughts on Azlan's post: Is love lust?
In modern biology, every cell in our body is selfish. In the same way, every person in our society is selfish. Take altruism. It is a provable hypothesis that animals help one another because their cooperation would lead to a better outcome for the group. In the same way, any kind of human cooperation can be construed to be selfish. I say construed because this is not the way we ordinarily used the word selfish. Thus, I want to seperate the notion of biological selfishness with selfishness of the will. Even if it were true that love is a product of biological selfishness(akin to lust), it does not follow for me that it is thus a selfishness of the will. Love can be real, even if a deterministic set of processes were underlying it.
In modern biology, every cell in our body is selfish. In the same way, every person in our society is selfish. Take altruism. It is a provable hypothesis that animals help one another because their cooperation would lead to a better outcome for the group. In the same way, any kind of human cooperation can be construed to be selfish. I say construed because this is not the way we ordinarily used the word selfish. Thus, I want to seperate the notion of biological selfishness with selfishness of the will. Even if it were true that love is a product of biological selfishness(akin to lust), it does not follow for me that it is thus a selfishness of the will. Love can be real, even if a deterministic set of processes were underlying it.
Wednesday, September 10, 2003
About Truthfulness
What does Nietzsche mean by Truthfulness? This surely is a term open to endless debate and disagreement. Thus, I shall attempt to say, not what it is, but what it is not in the naïve hope that this would be more fruitful.
There is Truth.
This seems fairly clear. In ‘intellectual conscience’ in 2:GS, he holds contempt for those who do not desire for certainty and calls them lower human beings. Bernard Williams also says that Nietzsche ‘holds on tenaciously to "an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world", for "their existence has been necessary to everything that we value”’ and offers several judicious quotes in support of his claim (WH’s post).
I take it here that ‘desire for certainty’ is not certainty in a myth, mask or noble lie, but certainty in the truth. For example, In section 1 of GS where he says that "man must from time to time believe he knows why he exists", it seems fairly clear (to me) that what a man believes in is not necessarily the truth, and thus not the truth that Nietzsche speaks of.
I also take it that the “ideal of truthfulness” is the same as “Truth”. That there is a will to, value of and ideal of truth implies that there is a truth.
Also, as the intro to the Kauffman edition says, Nietzsche does not seem to be a deconstructive sceptic that holds that there is no such thing as truth, or that truth simply what people think it is, or that truth is just a boring, useless, invented category. Rather, Nietzsche’s main question seems to be how to make truth bearable, and not that truth is malleable or dispensable.
Truth is not Scientific Truth
Scientific truth is only pure knowledge and not Truth, as evidenced in S.as.E (137) in which he lambastes scientists and university philosophers. We also see this is section 344 of GS: ‘In what way we, too, are pious’, where he says “"No doubt, that those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this "other world" - look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world, our world?".
But wait. Doesn’t section 344 also say that “it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rest… that God is truth; that truth is divine…”? Maybe what Nietzsche means then is that science is bad only on the fact that its metaphysical foundations are wrong; truth then can be found in another kind of science - maybe a science that is subjective (Tee How) and not dogmatic (Wenghong).
What does Nietzsche mean by Truthfulness? This surely is a term open to endless debate and disagreement. Thus, I shall attempt to say, not what it is, but what it is not in the naïve hope that this would be more fruitful.
There is Truth.
This seems fairly clear. In ‘intellectual conscience’ in 2:GS, he holds contempt for those who do not desire for certainty and calls them lower human beings. Bernard Williams also says that Nietzsche ‘holds on tenaciously to "an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world", for "their existence has been necessary to everything that we value”’ and offers several judicious quotes in support of his claim (WH’s post).
I take it here that ‘desire for certainty’ is not certainty in a myth, mask or noble lie, but certainty in the truth. For example, In section 1 of GS where he says that "man must from time to time believe he knows why he exists", it seems fairly clear (to me) that what a man believes in is not necessarily the truth, and thus not the truth that Nietzsche speaks of.
I also take it that the “ideal of truthfulness” is the same as “Truth”. That there is a will to, value of and ideal of truth implies that there is a truth.
Also, as the intro to the Kauffman edition says, Nietzsche does not seem to be a deconstructive sceptic that holds that there is no such thing as truth, or that truth simply what people think it is, or that truth is just a boring, useless, invented category. Rather, Nietzsche’s main question seems to be how to make truth bearable, and not that truth is malleable or dispensable.
Truth is not Scientific Truth
Scientific truth is only pure knowledge and not Truth, as evidenced in S.as.E (137) in which he lambastes scientists and university philosophers. We also see this is section 344 of GS: ‘In what way we, too, are pious’, where he says “"No doubt, that those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this "other world" - look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world, our world?".
But wait. Doesn’t section 344 also say that “it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rest… that God is truth; that truth is divine…”? Maybe what Nietzsche means then is that science is bad only on the fact that its metaphysical foundations are wrong; truth then can be found in another kind of science - maybe a science that is subjective (Tee How) and not dogmatic (Wenghong).
Thursday, September 04, 2003
Evolution
"Man must from time to time believe he knows why he exists" (bold my emphasis) (GS,29)
The very thought that all our purpose in life is a self-delusionary, yet necessary is certainly mind boggling!
This is almost the same as saying that all knowledge is relative, or there is no real knowledge (a postmodernist account), but we all must believe in that there is real knowledge.
I disagree with Nietzsche's fatalism. Simply because I think we have not just evolved into 'a fantastic animal that must fufil one condition of existence more than any other animal'(29), but that we have become entirely different creatures.
Nietzsche's convictions, which seem to follow from an evolutionary account of life, are surpassed by some modern accounts of evolution that hold that cultural evolution (memes) elevates humanity unto a different plane from plainly the genetic evolution of mere animals. Coupled with truly random fluctuations at the quantum level, I believe we must reject all crude fatalistic accounts that seem to follow from evolution.
"Man must from time to time believe he knows why he exists" (bold my emphasis) (GS,29)
The very thought that all our purpose in life is a self-delusionary, yet necessary is certainly mind boggling!
This is almost the same as saying that all knowledge is relative, or there is no real knowledge (a postmodernist account), but we all must believe in that there is real knowledge.
I disagree with Nietzsche's fatalism. Simply because I think we have not just evolved into 'a fantastic animal that must fufil one condition of existence more than any other animal'(29), but that we have become entirely different creatures.
Nietzsche's convictions, which seem to follow from an evolutionary account of life, are surpassed by some modern accounts of evolution that hold that cultural evolution (memes) elevates humanity unto a different plane from plainly the genetic evolution of mere animals. Coupled with truly random fluctuations at the quantum level, I believe we must reject all crude fatalistic accounts that seem to follow from evolution.
Thursday, August 28, 2003
What does it take to be a True Man (superman?) ?
They are those true men, those who are no longer animal, the philosophers, artists and saints. (159)
What does it mean to be a true man? Especially, what does it mean to be a saint?
it does not matter so much the method and circumstances under which one examines (life) but that he actually does examine it. - Joyce
I think Nietzsche would disagree. He doesn't want us to just examine it, but to become something, a 'true man'. But how do you become a true person?
They are those true men, those who are no longer animal, the philosophers, artists and saints. (159)
What does it mean to be a true man? Especially, what does it mean to be a saint?
it does not matter so much the method and circumstances under which one examines (life) but that he actually does examine it. - Joyce
I think Nietzsche would disagree. He doesn't want us to just examine it, but to become something, a 'true man'. But how do you become a true person?
The Philosophy Circle
I think on behalf of Wenghong and Leon as well, I would like to invite everyone to take a look and participate in The Philosophy Circle.
For those who don't know, this is a website maintained by certain individuals in our philosophy department for our philosophy department. I might prove useful as a discussion forum for other topics of interest. For example, Leon has posted something on Tolerance. Do check it out!
I think on behalf of Wenghong and Leon as well, I would like to invite everyone to take a look and participate in The Philosophy Circle.
For those who don't know, this is a website maintained by certain individuals in our philosophy department for our philosophy department. I might prove useful as a discussion forum for other topics of interest. For example, Leon has posted something on Tolerance. Do check it out!
The Oscillation between Christianity and Antiquity.
Pg.133. The explanation of this spiritlessness and of why all moral energy is at such a low ebb is difficult and involved; but no one who considers the influence victorious Christianity had on the morality of our ancient world can overlook the reaction of declining Christianity upon our own time. Through the exaltedness of its ideal, Christianity excelled the moral systems of antiquity and the naturalism that resided in them to such a degree that this naturalism came to excite apathy and disgust; but later on, when these better and higher ideals, though now known, proved unattainable, it was no longer possible to return to what was good and high in antique virtue, however much one might want to. It is in this oscillation between Christianity and antiquity, between an imitated or hypocritical Christian morality and an equally despondent and timid revival of antiquity, that modern man lives, and does not live very happily; the fear of what is natural he has inherited and the renewed attraction of this naturalness, the desire for a firm footing somewhere, the impotence of his knowledge that reels back and forth between the good and the better, all this engenders a restlessness, a disorder in the modern soul which condemns it to a joyless unfruitfulness.
One point which I'm currently endeavouring to understand is Nietzsche's view of "modern" day morals. First, there was the moral systems of antiquity. Then Christianity came along, and made these morals into lofty unattainable ideals. The word that I'm struggling to understand here is 'naturalism', but it caused apathy and disgust.
I think naturalism either means: "Definition 1. in literature, a method of depicting life that reflects a philosophy of determinism", or "Definition 3. in theology, the doctrine that religious truth derives from nature rather than from revelation. "
So when people became sick and tired of Christianity, they were left with either a washed down version of Christian morals, or some lousy antique moral system, which led to 'joyless unfruitfulness'.
So now, what is Nietzsche's solution to this problem? I long to find out...
Pg.133. The explanation of this spiritlessness and of why all moral energy is at such a low ebb is difficult and involved; but no one who considers the influence victorious Christianity had on the morality of our ancient world can overlook the reaction of declining Christianity upon our own time. Through the exaltedness of its ideal, Christianity excelled the moral systems of antiquity and the naturalism that resided in them to such a degree that this naturalism came to excite apathy and disgust; but later on, when these better and higher ideals, though now known, proved unattainable, it was no longer possible to return to what was good and high in antique virtue, however much one might want to. It is in this oscillation between Christianity and antiquity, between an imitated or hypocritical Christian morality and an equally despondent and timid revival of antiquity, that modern man lives, and does not live very happily; the fear of what is natural he has inherited and the renewed attraction of this naturalness, the desire for a firm footing somewhere, the impotence of his knowledge that reels back and forth between the good and the better, all this engenders a restlessness, a disorder in the modern soul which condemns it to a joyless unfruitfulness.
One point which I'm currently endeavouring to understand is Nietzsche's view of "modern" day morals. First, there was the moral systems of antiquity. Then Christianity came along, and made these morals into lofty unattainable ideals. The word that I'm struggling to understand here is 'naturalism', but it caused apathy and disgust.
I think naturalism either means: "Definition 1. in literature, a method of depicting life that reflects a philosophy of determinism", or "Definition 3. in theology, the doctrine that religious truth derives from nature rather than from revelation. "
So when people became sick and tired of Christianity, they were left with either a washed down version of Christian morals, or some lousy antique moral system, which led to 'joyless unfruitfulness'.
So now, what is Nietzsche's solution to this problem? I long to find out...
Applying Philosophy to Philosopy..
I like Nietszhe's views on science as a discipline. I assume that he would be fairly against a materialistic view of the world. Science, the (arguably) most influencial force in our time, is according to Nietzsche, only 'pure knowledge' and not 'truth' (137). Being partial to science myself, I wonder what others think?
Interestingly, I also wonder what Nietzsche would think of philosopy today (or some branches of it)? Are we, like Kant, only chasing 'pure' but irrelevant knowledge? What is philosophy? Is it only about "the thrill of the hunt"? Or is it about the truth? Philosopher: "lover of wisdom". Wisdom = Truth or pure knowledge? Is there even 'truth? Is the disctinction between truth and pure knowledge tenable (or maybe ineffective ;) )?
Tee How has an excellent exposition on this topic entiled "The Deign of Subjectivity", and I agree entirely with it!
I like Nietszhe's views on science as a discipline. I assume that he would be fairly against a materialistic view of the world. Science, the (arguably) most influencial force in our time, is according to Nietzsche, only 'pure knowledge' and not 'truth' (137). Being partial to science myself, I wonder what others think?
Interestingly, I also wonder what Nietzsche would think of philosopy today (or some branches of it)? Are we, like Kant, only chasing 'pure' but irrelevant knowledge? What is philosophy? Is it only about "the thrill of the hunt"? Or is it about the truth? Philosopher: "lover of wisdom". Wisdom = Truth or pure knowledge? Is there even 'truth? Is the disctinction between truth and pure knowledge tenable (or maybe ineffective ;) )?
Tee How has an excellent exposition on this topic entiled "The Deign of Subjectivity", and I agree entirely with it!
Here are some interesting philosophical questions from Nietzsche that I still don't know the answers to...
1. How can we take control (be the helmsman) of our existence? Through self-knowledge, self-enlightenment (160)? Why is this a metaphysical goal (160)? How is this the 'perfecting of nature' (160)?
2. Where does animal end and man begin? (158)
3. What is man's reason for existence? Is it for dramatic poetry (160)? The production of great men (161)?
apologies for the non-pc language;just quoting.
1. How can we take control (be the helmsman) of our existence? Through self-knowledge, self-enlightenment (160)? Why is this a metaphysical goal (160)? How is this the 'perfecting of nature' (160)?
2. Where does animal end and man begin? (158)
3. What is man's reason for existence? Is it for dramatic poetry (160)? The production of great men (161)?
apologies for the non-pc language;just quoting.
On Reading Nietzsche
There have been some posts recently on how hard it is to access Nietzsche's philosopy as he is so literary. Prof Holdbo has also refrained for answering how best we should approach Nietzsche. Maybe this is because there is no one way, but perhaps, sir, it would be helpful to share with us your view? Don't worry, I'm sure we'll formulate our own views and approaches as we read more of Nietzsche.
Good of you though, Tee How, to stand up for Nietzsche!
As another point, I find it more productive to read Nietzsche with a slant. Why I first voted (as 2nd spot) for Nietzsche is because he was described as developing a philosophy of morality for the atheistic modern man. Perhaps you too, by concentrating on one angle, will make things much easier and interesting. Best of luck!
There have been some posts recently on how hard it is to access Nietzsche's philosopy as he is so literary. Prof Holdbo has also refrained for answering how best we should approach Nietzsche. Maybe this is because there is no one way, but perhaps, sir, it would be helpful to share with us your view? Don't worry, I'm sure we'll formulate our own views and approaches as we read more of Nietzsche.
Good of you though, Tee How, to stand up for Nietzsche!
As another point, I find it more productive to read Nietzsche with a slant. Why I first voted (as 2nd spot) for Nietzsche is because he was described as developing a philosophy of morality for the atheistic modern man. Perhaps you too, by concentrating on one angle, will make things much easier and interesting. Best of luck!
Friday, August 15, 2003
...it is a painful and dangerous undertaking to thus tunnel into oneself...(UM,129)
You know, I'm curious. Painful, I'd agree, but why is it dangerous to examine who we are? So far, I think its something that everyone should do.
Ah! I found the answer from SAE (140) which gives the two dangers as isolation and despair of the truth.
p.s.Actually, as Wenghong has kindly pointed out, there is more than 2! Will write about this is another post.
You know, I'm curious. Painful, I'd agree, but why is it dangerous to examine who we are? So far, I think its something that everyone should do.
Ah! I found the answer from SAE (140) which gives the two dangers as isolation and despair of the truth.
p.s.Actually, as Wenghong has kindly pointed out, there is more than 2! Will write about this is another post.
Thursday, August 14, 2003
Can we really break free of culture?
What does Nietzsche really mean when he says that we should 'be ourselves'?
Page 1 of Untimely Meditations: Nietzsche defintely has a bad opinion of culture. He thinks that people are being lazy in not 'being themselves', and that the ideal is the 'artist' or 'great thinker'.
Well, I think that Nietzsche is mostly right. We must not be lazy and become 'factory products'. (I know of many people that do not seriously evaluate their cultural paradigm).
But there are a lot of complexities that come into the way. Firstly, culture is not entirely bad, but not only does culture make us, but we are our culture. Can we actually break free and 'be ourselves' when perhaps all we can do is 'find' another culture to believe in? Secondly, 'the mass' is no more that identifiable. In today's terms, what is the mass? Almost everyone is thoroughly different in interests and opinions nowadays. Who are the factory products and who are not? I wonder.
Ultimately, it seems that all Nietzsche is saying to me is the same as what Socrates said all that time ago: 'the unexamined life is not worth living'.
What does Nietzsche really mean when he says that we should 'be ourselves'?
Page 1 of Untimely Meditations: Nietzsche defintely has a bad opinion of culture. He thinks that people are being lazy in not 'being themselves', and that the ideal is the 'artist' or 'great thinker'.
Well, I think that Nietzsche is mostly right. We must not be lazy and become 'factory products'. (I know of many people that do not seriously evaluate their cultural paradigm).
But there are a lot of complexities that come into the way. Firstly, culture is not entirely bad, but not only does culture make us, but we are our culture. Can we actually break free and 'be ourselves' when perhaps all we can do is 'find' another culture to believe in? Secondly, 'the mass' is no more that identifiable. In today's terms, what is the mass? Almost everyone is thoroughly different in interests and opinions nowadays. Who are the factory products and who are not? I wonder.
Ultimately, it seems that all Nietzsche is saying to me is the same as what Socrates said all that time ago: 'the unexamined life is not worth living'.
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