Essay Topic

I must say that On the Genealogy of Morals is the best read so far for me of Nietzsche’s works. It’s got arguments! The exhilaration! The epiphany!

Anyway, the topic I wish to explore is ‘Is the genealogy of morals a morally relativist concept?’

The passage that inspires this topic is actually the footnote to Book One of GM:

Note. I take the opportunity provided by this treatise to express publicly and formally a desire I have previously voiced only in occasional conversation with scholars; namely, that some philosophical faculty might advance historical studies of morality through a series of academic prize-essays—perhaps this present book will serve to provide a powerful impetus in this direction. In case this idea should be implemented, I suggest the following question: it deserves the attention of philologists and historians as well as that of professional philosophers:
"What light does linguistics, and especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of moral concepts?"
On the other hand, it is equally necessary to engage the interest of physiologists and doctors in these problems (of the value of existing evaluations); it may be left to academic philosophers to act as advocates and mediators in this matter too, after they have on the whole succeeded in the past in transforming the originally so reserved and mistrustful relations between philosophy, physiology, and medicine into the most amicable and fruitful exchange. Indeed, every table of values, every "thou shalt" known to history or ethnology, requires first a physiological investigation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and every one of them needs a critique on the part of medical science. The question: what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"? should be viewed from the most divers perspectives; for the problem "value for what?" cannot be examined too subtly. Something, for example, that possessed obvious value in relation to the longest possible survival of a race (or to the enhancement of its power of adaptation to a particular climate or to the reservation of the greatest number) would by no means possess the same value if it were a question, for instance, of producing a stronger type. The well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value: to consider the former a priori of higher value may be left to the naïveté of English biologists.— All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values.

First, Nietzsche believes that a philosophical inquiry into the History of Morality is possible. At the same time, the project will need philologists, historians, and doctors. What does this mean for Nietzsche’s conception of morality? Does this mean that all the historical-relativistic shades of morality can be stripped away through inquiry to reveal its core? He seems to suggest this when he speaks of Nobility being the first ‘good’. Is Nietzsche ultimately a realist about morals?

Or is Nietzsche a pragmatist about morals? After all, he says that Christian morality was good for a while, but now must be discarded because it has ceased to be helpful anymore. (note: I’m not sure what to quote to support this statement, as it was garnered from the discussion in class)

Most tellingly, I feel, is Nietzsche’s question “what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"?”. It implies very strongly that there is not one value or moral, but many tables of values and “morals”. This seems to show that Nietzsche is a relativist about morality. It is probably even compatible with the pragmatist. I thus wish to show that this actually is the case. Ultimately, I hope to elucidate Nietzsche’s conception of morality.