'We are up against a people who think...They invented and successfully promoted socialism, communism, human rights and democracy so that persecuting them would appear to be wrong, so they may enjoy equal rights with others.'
- Dr Mahathir on Jews. Straits Times, Oct 17th

Well, it seems that there are at least some people who hold seriously the view of slave morality. But how do assertian that this is indeed a historical fact? How do you prove that socialism, communism, human rights and democracy really originated with the Jews? Is etymology really enough?

Some Arguments against Etymology
The fact that etymological arguments are today not employed in philosophy is a strong indication of the fact that such lines of arguments are weak. Nietzsche conclusion that Schuld [guilt] is derived from Schulden [debt] appears to rely on similarity of sound and is at best only circumstantial evidence that their original meanings were such. His etymological evidence does not seem to have been corroborated by anyone else. He further undermines his own evidence by saying in GM I 13 that the ‘seduction of language’ can make a force appear otherwise . Surely language shifts and adopts new meanings over time. Some terms acquire meanings totally opposite from the original. For example, we all know 'gay' has taken on a meaning totally different from its original, yet they do now have any significant logical or historical connection. A person making such etymological studies must therefore be very careful not to make connections where there are not any, and I am not convinced that Nietzsche did not make such an error.

While Nietzsche, as a philologist, provides examples several examples in many languages, he crucially left out certain Asian conceptions of morality. For example, Zen Buddhist and Confucian morality appear to be descended from nature and society respectively, and not from nobility. I believe that Nietzsche will find it hard to show any history of a slave morality inverting the values of a noble morality, and even if he did, such morality (such as Buddhist ascetic value) surely did not come from the Jewish tradition.

The biggest objection however, is that even if morality did arise from certain historical scenarios, it does not follow that these moralities are false. The weakness of the argument from etymology is of course the move from ‘morality is malleable’ to ‘there is no absolute morality’. A Christian, for example, can still hold that Christian morality is true because it is based on a revelation from God (The etymology of the word 'Good' according to Webster is from the old english 'gOd'). At best then, Nietzshe's analysis must be viewed as simply an alternative thesis on the origin of morality. Because I have not come across other etymological studies comparing these competing accounts, I am unable to say if Nietzsche's etymological analysis is permissable for

Together, I feel that the argument from etymology is considerably weak. However, Nietzsche does not claim that his analysis is objective fact. Perhaps he just meant the argument to support his view that all morality is only intepretations (his perspecitvism). If this were the case, then we must read his arguments from etymology in that light and not any other.

Essay Topic

I must say that On the Genealogy of Morals is the best read so far for me of Nietzsche’s works. It’s got arguments! The exhilaration! The epiphany!

Anyway, the topic I wish to explore is ‘Is the genealogy of morals a morally relativist concept?’

The passage that inspires this topic is actually the footnote to Book One of GM:

Note. I take the opportunity provided by this treatise to express publicly and formally a desire I have previously voiced only in occasional conversation with scholars; namely, that some philosophical faculty might advance historical studies of morality through a series of academic prize-essays—perhaps this present book will serve to provide a powerful impetus in this direction. In case this idea should be implemented, I suggest the following question: it deserves the attention of philologists and historians as well as that of professional philosophers:
"What light does linguistics, and especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of moral concepts?"
On the other hand, it is equally necessary to engage the interest of physiologists and doctors in these problems (of the value of existing evaluations); it may be left to academic philosophers to act as advocates and mediators in this matter too, after they have on the whole succeeded in the past in transforming the originally so reserved and mistrustful relations between philosophy, physiology, and medicine into the most amicable and fruitful exchange. Indeed, every table of values, every "thou shalt" known to history or ethnology, requires first a physiological investigation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and every one of them needs a critique on the part of medical science. The question: what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"? should be viewed from the most divers perspectives; for the problem "value for what?" cannot be examined too subtly. Something, for example, that possessed obvious value in relation to the longest possible survival of a race (or to the enhancement of its power of adaptation to a particular climate or to the reservation of the greatest number) would by no means possess the same value if it were a question, for instance, of producing a stronger type. The well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value: to consider the former a priori of higher value may be left to the naïveté of English biologists.— All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values.

First, Nietzsche believes that a philosophical inquiry into the History of Morality is possible. At the same time, the project will need philologists, historians, and doctors. What does this mean for Nietzsche’s conception of morality? Does this mean that all the historical-relativistic shades of morality can be stripped away through inquiry to reveal its core? He seems to suggest this when he speaks of Nobility being the first ‘good’. Is Nietzsche ultimately a realist about morals?

Or is Nietzsche a pragmatist about morals? After all, he says that Christian morality was good for a while, but now must be discarded because it has ceased to be helpful anymore. (note: I’m not sure what to quote to support this statement, as it was garnered from the discussion in class)

Most tellingly, I feel, is Nietzsche’s question “what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"?”. It implies very strongly that there is not one value or moral, but many tables of values and “morals”. This seems to show that Nietzsche is a relativist about morality. It is probably even compatible with the pragmatist. I thus wish to show that this actually is the case. Ultimately, I hope to elucidate Nietzsche’s conception of morality.