Is a probalistic cause a problem for free will? A sociobiologist might want to claim that epigenetic rules (or - behaviour causing genes) only play out probabilistically. Let us suppose that the sociobiologist is able to provide a clear account of a truly probalistic mechanism, perhaps quantum fluctuations, such that an action is really is caused by genes say 90% of the time. Although not strictly deterministic, this scenario still seems to pose a problem for free will.
Take for example William Rowe's account that an action is free if the agent causes the volition to do the action, and it was in his power not to cause his volition to do the action. According to a sociobiologist, it is the gene that causes the volition to do the action (my defective gene caused me to hate and thereby murder). It does not seem to matter that the causation is effective only 90% of the time, for the cause of the action was not you as a free agent, but your genes. Therefore, the charge of genetic 'determinism' seems to remain even though the process is not deterministic.
Wednesday, February 11, 2004
Saturday, February 07, 2004
Quantum physics a way out of determinism?
The true probablistic nature of quantum mechanics provides a possible mechanism for free will. However, there are problems with stating clearly how it might work.
First, the macro will wash out all the micro fluctuations at the quantum level. Take the computer. Electronics make use of quantum processes but yet always produce a determined outcome. Yes, it is possible that a computer bit might flip once every 100 years because of quantum flux, but that obviously is not enough to get us out of determinism. Instead, one must claim that the brain, for example, makes use of quantum processes such that the randomness actually transmits to our actions. Perhaps this is plausible after all
Second, true randomness seems to suggest pure chance. There must be an explanation of how real decisions have a basis on random fluctuations. I suppose that our decisions can be defined as randomness that takes place in us. At least its not determined.
Third, String theory suggests that quantum fluctuations might be predictable, or at least explainable. Does that pose a problem for quantum free will? I'm not sure about this.
First, the macro will wash out all the micro fluctuations at the quantum level. Take the computer. Electronics make use of quantum processes but yet always produce a determined outcome. Yes, it is possible that a computer bit might flip once every 100 years because of quantum flux, but that obviously is not enough to get us out of determinism. Instead, one must claim that the brain, for example, makes use of quantum processes such that the randomness actually transmits to our actions. Perhaps this is plausible after all
Second, true randomness seems to suggest pure chance. There must be an explanation of how real decisions have a basis on random fluctuations. I suppose that our decisions can be defined as randomness that takes place in us. At least its not determined.
Third, String theory suggests that quantum fluctuations might be predictable, or at least explainable. Does that pose a problem for quantum free will? I'm not sure about this.
Probablistic cause poses no problem for free will?
If someone could predict your action 99% of the time, do you still have free will?
It is conceivable that even if someone's action were predicted 100% of the time, that his action were free. For example, if Gary hates durians, and I predict 100% correctly that through his whole life he would choose an orange over a durian. Yet, his action was free.
But this is the case with only one particular action. What if every action of a person were predictable a 100% of the time. Suddenly, the person doesn't appear to have free will anymore; if we can predict a person's every action 100% of the time, it would have to be that his actions were caused by something known to us.
Let's seperate the implicit premises. If my prediction was by pure chance, and not based on some deterministic cause, it appears that 100% predictability of a person's every action and his having free will is not incompatible. Of course the chance of getting it 100% right is vanishingly small, but it is not impossible.
Yet, we believe that the chance is so small that it should be taken as being impossible. I believe that it cannot be taken as so. Probablistic cause is only an indicator that free will might not be present, but it is not incompatible with free will.
It is conceivable that even if someone's action were predicted 100% of the time, that his action were free. For example, if Gary hates durians, and I predict 100% correctly that through his whole life he would choose an orange over a durian. Yet, his action was free.
But this is the case with only one particular action. What if every action of a person were predictable a 100% of the time. Suddenly, the person doesn't appear to have free will anymore; if we can predict a person's every action 100% of the time, it would have to be that his actions were caused by something known to us.
Let's seperate the implicit premises. If my prediction was by pure chance, and not based on some deterministic cause, it appears that 100% predictability of a person's every action and his having free will is not incompatible. Of course the chance of getting it 100% right is vanishingly small, but it is not impossible.
Yet, we believe that the chance is so small that it should be taken as being impossible. I believe that it cannot be taken as so. Probablistic cause is only an indicator that free will might not be present, but it is not incompatible with free will.
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