Is a probalistic cause a problem for free will? A sociobiologist might want to claim that epigenetic rules (or - behaviour causing genes) only play out probabilistically. Let us suppose that the sociobiologist is able to provide a clear account of a truly probalistic mechanism, perhaps quantum fluctuations, such that an action is really is caused by genes say 90% of the time. Although not strictly deterministic, this scenario still seems to pose a problem for free will.
Take for example William Rowe's account that an action is free if the agent causes the volition to do the action, and it was in his power not to cause his volition to do the action. According to a sociobiologist, it is the gene that causes the volition to do the action (my defective gene caused me to hate and thereby murder). It does not seem to matter that the causation is effective only 90% of the time, for the cause of the action was not you as a free agent, but your genes. Therefore, the charge of genetic 'determinism' seems to remain even though the process is not deterministic.
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