Testable hypothesis

Testable hypothesis:

If God exists,

the number of people who trust in God fully, and who follow his will in doing something that otherwise make no sense, but who then come to regret that act, will be very low.

Coherence and Parsimony

Coherence:1 : the quality or state of cohering : as a : systematic or logical connection or consistency b : integration of diverse elements, relationships, or values

Parsimony: 2 : economy in the use of means to an end; especially : economy of explanation in conformity with Occam's razor

Coherence and parsimony are two "rules of thought" that I sincerely subscribe to. You can say that I have faith in them, even more so than in the divine. I believe that all the facts about the world, including religious statements, must be coherent and parsimonious. That is, I would not believe something, including religion, unless it makes sense by being coherent and parsimonious.

If God is real, then all the facts about religion and about the world must make sense and cohere into one body of knowledge. It cannot be that we believe in the facts about the world in one moment, and then switch and then say that facts about religion are true in another. Another way to say it is that there can only by one reality. The world really exists, as I hope we can all agree, so if God exists, then religious facts heaven, souls and devils for example cannot contradict what we know about the world. They must cohere into one reasonable whole. So if a religion tells me that the earth is the centre of the universe, and we find that it instead revolves around the sun, then one these statements has got to be wrong and must be rejected. Miracles and a loving God involved in the world seem to contradict the laws of physics and the amount of suffering and evil in the world respectively. One of them must be untrue, or at least a reasonable explanation must be given to show why they are not necessarily contradictory.

This brings me to the principle of parsimony. If there exists two explanations to something, then all things being equal, we should accept the simpler one and reject the more complex one. For example I come home and find a window broken and the TV missing. One reason could be that someone broke in and stole it; another is that my TV broke down, my mum took it to repair, and somehow accidentally broke the window just at that spot as well. Based on the same evidence, we take the more direct evidence. In the same way, science has explained a lot of what used to be mysterious and miraculous. A crucial example is where people used to look at nature and be convinced that the only way such complex and beautiful animals can emerge is through an intelligent creator. Evolution has shown how all that is possible just by random natural processes. Rather than go the roundabout way of saying that God made the world such that evolution will take place and such animals will emerge, it makes more sense to just say that evolution did it. Why take the more complicated reason?

What is the philosophical method?
Philosophy is pretty much
pure thinking. And styles of thought have changed quite a lot from one era to
another. I teach a course for doctoral students where I look at the history of
the development of the idea of what is philosophical method? And 10 weeks is not
enough to cover all of that. There have also been big changes in theology. Some
people would say that theologians merely interpret the content of the
scriptures, others say that theology is a discipline that reflects on human
religious awareness, and some of us would say that you've got to be doing both
of those all the time. But my own entree into the theological field was taking
my background in philosophy of science and asking, "What are the parallels in
theology?" And of course the data have to be different, just as the data for
biology are different from the data for physics. But what I was able to argue is
that the structure of reasoning is the same, or at least could be the same in
those two radically different kinds of disciplines. You're forming hypotheses to
try to explain the data in the most coherent and parsimonious way in both cases.



Occam's razor
Pronunciation:
'ä-k&mz-
Function: noun
Etymology: William of Occam
: a
scientific and philosophic rule that entities should not be multiplied
unnecessarily which is interpreted as requiring that the simplest of competing
theories be preferred to the more complex or that explanations of unknown
phenomena be sought first in terms of known quantities

Hi!

It's been a long time since I've posted to this blog, but I think I shall try to add little snippets of information and I grapple with the issues of science and religion. Some will be snippets of information, and some will be thoughts. Over time, let's see where it leads!

Reason #4: The idea of an all-loving God is inconsistent

Current Verdict: Don't know
Certainty (-5 to 5): 0

1. God is all-good and all-loving.

2. God has free will.
- makes sense actually. We are made in the image of Him. He created us out of love. He gave us his only son. Jesus died for us when he could have chose not to. A being that has free will is more perfect than a being that is acting as a robot would. All these imply that God has free will.

3. Free will means the ability to do evil, as well as good.

4. Since God has free will, then he could have done evil.

5. But if God could have done evil, then he is not all-good.

6. Therefore, the idea of an all-good God is inconsistent; God cannot be all good.

Reason #2: The possibility of Artificial Intelligence

Current Verdict: Against the existence of God
Certainty (-5 to 5): -2

Ever watched the show A.I by Steven Spielberg? Do you believe that Artificial Intelligence is possible? What I mean is that one day we would be able to create life, real life that thinks and has free will.

I am convinced that one day this is a certainty. This is because I believe that our intelligence came about through natural causes (evolution). I believe that if we recreate the same steps that created us, new sentient life can emerge. My confidence comes from the twin enterprises of genetics and computing. While this process should be much more complicated and take much longer than one usually imagines, I still think that is possible.

Edmond (a philosopher friend) believes that AI is incompatible with Catholic beliefs, for God is the creator of life and we are not God. I think he might be a little too fast in saying this. It is possible that by giving us free will, God has given us the ability to be like God, and thus to create new life. Another possibility is that God has guided our hands in creating this new life. Thus, should AI one day be created, Catholics might still be able to reconcile this with their faith. At this point, the existence of AI appears neutral with regards to the question of whether God exists.

But imagine that we could arbitrarily create life, with varying abilities - some with incomplete intelligences. Imagine a race of slave robots that are semi-intelligent. Imagine that instead of robots they were flesh and blood beings. Remember the restaurant at the end of the universe in the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy? In it a sentient cow asks the protaganist which part of the cow he wants to eat and starts to promote the different sections of its body. It explains in a bored voice: "Don't worry. I've been bred for this purpose. I'm happy to give up my life for your dinner. Now, the sirlion.. i must say, what a choice.."

Is such a being even possible? If it is, it does goes against the idea of a God that is loving and just. I don't believe that if a sentient race of aliens existed God would prefer Humans over them and give humans dominion over them. Instead, all sentient life appears to be equal in the eyes of God. The possibility of "semi"-sentience and the arbitrary creation of life thus opposes such a concept of God.

Another way of looking at it is to say that the soul appears to be created by evolution. If we understand 'soul' here to mean the same thing as minds having consciousness and rational thought, then evolution does seem able to explain how the human mind, or 'soul', came about. Pope John Paul says that evolution can be accepted as creating the human body, but not the human soul. The possibility of A.I. contradicts the idea that the soul comes from God, since we can create and manipulate these souls arbitrarily.

...click below for full text

Reason #1: The Problem of Evil

Current verdict: Against the existence of God
Certainty (-5 to 5): -3

"Perhaps the greatest obstacle for religious belief met by a christian believer in his or her own reflections and coming also from unbelievers, is the obvious existence of evil in the world evil seems to negate any possibility of a loving God and of a revelation from Him. I am not thinking here of moral evil (sin) Sin is perhaps inevitable considering the fact that man is free to obey or disobey God's commandments Rather I am thinking of things like natural catastrophes (floods, earthquakes, fires, plagues) which apparently destroy indiscriminately the good and the bad alike Plainly this is not a perfect world. If Godi s all-powerful and all-loving, why did God create a world in which there is so much suffering? One answer is that the Creator did not, but suffering came in as a retribution for the sin of the first man ("original sin") when he disobeyed God. While this answer still tries the faith of the Christian believer it offers nothing to the unbeliever. For the , unbeliever a more acceptable answer might be that God created a world good enough to serve as the theater of man's activities, yet imperfect enough to force man to use his own ingenuity and skills to control the forces of nature Including the destructive ones. A third answer, satisfying again only to a Christian believer, is that all sufferings, all injustices and inequities, will be set right in the next life. In the final analysis, the problem of evil in the world remains unsolved."

Ever heard of the silly question: "If a tree falls in the forest and no one sees or hears it, did it fall?" Well, suppose that a tree falls in the forest and kills an ant that happened to be passing by, which I am absolutely sure has happened before. Now, could it not have been that God could have made is such that the tree fell without killing the ant. Surely there are moments when no ants are underneath. The ant need not have died needlessly. Isn't it in some sense evil that it died when it need not have?

But that is the reality of the world that this supposedly perfect God created. Nature is not really perfect. The reality of nature is that many animals die horrible deaths and only a few survive to reproduce and almost none survive to a 'ripe old age'.

For me, there is no satisfactory answer why a God that is all good would make the world the way it is.

Is a probalistic cause a problem for free will?

Is a probalistic cause a problem for free will? A sociobiologist might want to claim that epigenetic rules (or - behaviour causing genes) only play out probabilistically. Let us suppose that the sociobiologist is able to provide a clear account of a truly probalistic mechanism, perhaps quantum fluctuations, such that an action is really is caused by genes say 90% of the time. Although not strictly deterministic, this scenario still seems to pose a problem for free will.

Take for example William Rowe's account that an action is free if the agent causes the volition to do the action, and it was in his power not to cause his volition to do the action. According to a sociobiologist, it is the gene that causes the volition to do the action (my defective gene caused me to hate and thereby murder). It does not seem to matter that the causation is effective only 90% of the time, for the cause of the action was not you as a free agent, but your genes. Therefore, the charge of genetic 'determinism' seems to remain even though the process is not deterministic.

Quantum physics a way out of determinism?

The true probablistic nature of quantum mechanics provides a possible mechanism for free will. However, there are problems with stating clearly how it might work.

First, the macro will wash out all the micro fluctuations at the quantum level. Take the computer. Electronics make use of quantum processes but yet always produce a determined outcome. Yes, it is possible that a computer bit might flip once every 100 years because of quantum flux, but that obviously is not enough to get us out of determinism. Instead, one must claim that the brain, for example, makes use of quantum processes such that the randomness actually transmits to our actions. Perhaps this is plausible after all

Second, true randomness seems to suggest pure chance. There must be an explanation of how real decisions have a basis on random fluctuations. I suppose that our decisions can be defined as randomness that takes place in us. At least its not determined.

Third, String theory suggests that quantum fluctuations might be predictable, or at least explainable. Does that pose a problem for quantum free will? I'm not sure about this.

Probablistic cause poses no problem for free will?

If someone could predict your action 99% of the time, do you still have free will?

It is conceivable that even if someone's action were predicted 100% of the time, that his action were free. For example, if Gary hates durians, and I predict 100% correctly that through his whole life he would choose an orange over a durian. Yet, his action was free.

But this is the case with only one particular action. What if every action of a person were predictable a 100% of the time. Suddenly, the person doesn't appear to have free will anymore; if we can predict a person's every action 100% of the time, it would have to be that his actions were caused by something known to us.

Let's seperate the implicit premises. If my prediction was by pure chance, and not based on some deterministic cause, it appears that 100% predictability of a person's every action and his having free will is not incompatible. Of course the chance of getting it 100% right is vanishingly small, but it is not impossible.

Yet, we believe that the chance is so small that it should be taken as being impossible. I believe that it cannot be taken as so. Probablistic cause is only an indicator that free will might not be present, but it is not incompatible with free will.

What is Cause

Let's say plunging this knife into my chest, X, has a 99% chance of killing me, Y. Let's say that this knife actually does kill me. Therefore, plunging this knife caused me to die. We use cause here to show that X is sufficient to cause Y, and that Y did actually happen.

In the 1% chance that this knife does not end in my dying, then X did not cause Y. X is therefore not a necessary cause.

Free will seems to be a problem only when causes in a causal chain are necessary.

But such probabalism should not be present in the mechanistic universe unless quantum probabilty or some other similar mechanism were introduced into the system.

But doesn't a high probabilty, even in a probablistic universe, cause a problem for free will? Isn't it a problem when your actions are caused at least 99% of the time?

The Knowledge Argument

The knowledge argument is an argument against physicalism. We are to imagine that Mary is a person that learns every physical fact possible about vision, but since birth has lived only in a black and white room. Even if all physical facts are known to her through her black and white television and books, if she goes out to the colourful world, it seems that she will know something more - namely what it is like to experience colour.

If there is something more to know besides physical facts, then there must be knowledge that is not about physical facts. Therefore, physicalism (the doctrine that there are only physical facts about the world) is false.

One objection is that colour is related to physical facts as aesthetics are related to physical facts. It appears plausible that a particular wavelength of light enters our eye and therefore red is an experience that is subjective upon those facts. But beauty is so much more subjective than colour. We can diagnose someone as colour blind but no one is ever 'beauty blind'. There is something about colour and pain that is more solid fact and qualia like than the subjectiveness of aesthetics.

I think it is possible that colour is epiphenomenal, and furthermore, that all phenomenal experience is exhausted upon the knowledge of all physical facts. That is, knowing all the physical facts about the anatomy of our visual system will result in us knowing the exact nerve firing pattern N that results in E, a e.g. red experience. Even if Mary has never experienced redness, knowing N, and reproducing N in her brain will result in an experience that is indistinguishable as seeing red. There exists no other experience that lies beyond this possibility.

No More Nietzsche!

I've decided that this shall no more be a blog about Nietzsche. I was forced to start this blog for my module last semester on Nietzsche. From now on, it shall be a place to post stuff that has to do with my thesis, or perhaps other interesting philosophical stuff.

'We are up against a people who think...They invented and successfully promoted socialism, communism, human rights and democracy so that persecuting them would appear to be wrong, so they may enjoy equal rights with others.'
- Dr Mahathir on Jews. Straits Times, Oct 17th

Well, it seems that there are at least some people who hold seriously the view of slave morality. But how do assertian that this is indeed a historical fact? How do you prove that socialism, communism, human rights and democracy really originated with the Jews? Is etymology really enough?

Some Arguments against Etymology
The fact that etymological arguments are today not employed in philosophy is a strong indication of the fact that such lines of arguments are weak. Nietzsche conclusion that Schuld [guilt] is derived from Schulden [debt] appears to rely on similarity of sound and is at best only circumstantial evidence that their original meanings were such. His etymological evidence does not seem to have been corroborated by anyone else. He further undermines his own evidence by saying in GM I 13 that the ‘seduction of language’ can make a force appear otherwise . Surely language shifts and adopts new meanings over time. Some terms acquire meanings totally opposite from the original. For example, we all know 'gay' has taken on a meaning totally different from its original, yet they do now have any significant logical or historical connection. A person making such etymological studies must therefore be very careful not to make connections where there are not any, and I am not convinced that Nietzsche did not make such an error.

While Nietzsche, as a philologist, provides examples several examples in many languages, he crucially left out certain Asian conceptions of morality. For example, Zen Buddhist and Confucian morality appear to be descended from nature and society respectively, and not from nobility. I believe that Nietzsche will find it hard to show any history of a slave morality inverting the values of a noble morality, and even if he did, such morality (such as Buddhist ascetic value) surely did not come from the Jewish tradition.

The biggest objection however, is that even if morality did arise from certain historical scenarios, it does not follow that these moralities are false. The weakness of the argument from etymology is of course the move from ‘morality is malleable’ to ‘there is no absolute morality’. A Christian, for example, can still hold that Christian morality is true because it is based on a revelation from God (The etymology of the word 'Good' according to Webster is from the old english 'gOd'). At best then, Nietzshe's analysis must be viewed as simply an alternative thesis on the origin of morality. Because I have not come across other etymological studies comparing these competing accounts, I am unable to say if Nietzsche's etymological analysis is permissable for

Together, I feel that the argument from etymology is considerably weak. However, Nietzsche does not claim that his analysis is objective fact. Perhaps he just meant the argument to support his view that all morality is only intepretations (his perspecitvism). If this were the case, then we must read his arguments from etymology in that light and not any other.

Essay Topic

I must say that On the Genealogy of Morals is the best read so far for me of Nietzsche’s works. It’s got arguments! The exhilaration! The epiphany!

Anyway, the topic I wish to explore is ‘Is the genealogy of morals a morally relativist concept?’

The passage that inspires this topic is actually the footnote to Book One of GM:

Note. I take the opportunity provided by this treatise to express publicly and formally a desire I have previously voiced only in occasional conversation with scholars; namely, that some philosophical faculty might advance historical studies of morality through a series of academic prize-essays—perhaps this present book will serve to provide a powerful impetus in this direction. In case this idea should be implemented, I suggest the following question: it deserves the attention of philologists and historians as well as that of professional philosophers:
"What light does linguistics, and especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of moral concepts?"
On the other hand, it is equally necessary to engage the interest of physiologists and doctors in these problems (of the value of existing evaluations); it may be left to academic philosophers to act as advocates and mediators in this matter too, after they have on the whole succeeded in the past in transforming the originally so reserved and mistrustful relations between philosophy, physiology, and medicine into the most amicable and fruitful exchange. Indeed, every table of values, every "thou shalt" known to history or ethnology, requires first a physiological investigation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and every one of them needs a critique on the part of medical science. The question: what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"? should be viewed from the most divers perspectives; for the problem "value for what?" cannot be examined too subtly. Something, for example, that possessed obvious value in relation to the longest possible survival of a race (or to the enhancement of its power of adaptation to a particular climate or to the reservation of the greatest number) would by no means possess the same value if it were a question, for instance, of producing a stronger type. The well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value: to consider the former a priori of higher value may be left to the naïveté of English biologists.— All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values.

First, Nietzsche believes that a philosophical inquiry into the History of Morality is possible. At the same time, the project will need philologists, historians, and doctors. What does this mean for Nietzsche’s conception of morality? Does this mean that all the historical-relativistic shades of morality can be stripped away through inquiry to reveal its core? He seems to suggest this when he speaks of Nobility being the first ‘good’. Is Nietzsche ultimately a realist about morals?

Or is Nietzsche a pragmatist about morals? After all, he says that Christian morality was good for a while, but now must be discarded because it has ceased to be helpful anymore. (note: I’m not sure what to quote to support this statement, as it was garnered from the discussion in class)

Most tellingly, I feel, is Nietzsche’s question “what is the value of this or that table of values and "morals"?”. It implies very strongly that there is not one value or moral, but many tables of values and “morals”. This seems to show that Nietzsche is a relativist about morality. It is probably even compatible with the pragmatist. I thus wish to show that this actually is the case. Ultimately, I hope to elucidate Nietzsche’s conception of morality.

Live life by your own ends, or live life for the society?
Society values the virtue of selflessness, but in fact, selflessness is valued insofar as it serves as a means to other ends, which society actually values more. It is conceivable that if selfishness were to serve as a better instrument than selflessness in promoting the ends which society desires, then society would extol the selfish, instead of the selfless. -wh

In this post, Wenghong implies that society values some values more than others. Neitzsche, in SAE, seems to imply some sort of social darwinism when he says that "[m]ankind must work continually at the production of individual great men" and that "nothing else is its task". If Nietzsche considers this value this highest of society, the ultimate end of society, then presumably he would want every person to adopt this ends as a personal end. I do not think that he is just using such a shocking premise to make us consider for ourselves what our life's ends are. However, he doesn't seem to advance or support this point in his other passages. All we are left with is "How can [life] be least squandered? Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable exemplars ... ". That's all - a 'certainly'. Which leads me to think that he is either wrong, or changed his mind about this. Puzzling.

Thoughts on Azlan's post: Is love lust?
In modern biology, every cell in our body is selfish. In the same way, every person in our society is selfish. Take altruism. It is a provable hypothesis that animals help one another because their cooperation would lead to a better outcome for the group. In the same way, any kind of human cooperation can be construed to be selfish. I say construed because this is not the way we ordinarily used the word selfish. Thus, I want to seperate the notion of biological selfishness with selfishness of the will. Even if it were true that love is a product of biological selfishness(akin to lust), it does not follow for me that it is thus a selfishness of the will. Love can be real, even if a deterministic set of processes were underlying it.

About Truthfulness

What does Nietzsche mean by Truthfulness? This surely is a term open to endless debate and disagreement. Thus, I shall attempt to say, not what it is, but what it is not in the naïve hope that this would be more fruitful.

There is Truth.

This seems fairly clear. In ‘intellectual conscience’ in 2:GS, he holds contempt for those who do not desire for certainty and calls them lower human beings. Bernard Williams also says that Nietzsche ‘holds on tenaciously to "an ideal of truthfulness that would not allow us to falsify or forget the horrors of the world", for "their existence has been necessary to everything that we value”’ and offers several judicious quotes in support of his claim (WH’s post).

I take it here that ‘desire for certainty’ is not certainty in a myth, mask or noble lie, but certainty in the truth. For example, In section 1 of GS where he says that "man must from time to time believe he knows why he exists", it seems fairly clear (to me) that what a man believes in is not necessarily the truth, and thus not the truth that Nietzsche speaks of.

I also take it that the “ideal of truthfulness” is the same as “Truth”. That there is a will to, value of and ideal of truth implies that there is a truth.

Also, as the intro to the Kauffman edition says, Nietzsche does not seem to be a deconstructive sceptic that holds that there is no such thing as truth, or that truth simply what people think it is, or that truth is just a boring, useless, invented category. Rather, Nietzsche’s main question seems to be how to make truth bearable, and not that truth is malleable or dispensable.

Truth is not Scientific Truth

Scientific truth is only pure knowledge and not Truth, as evidenced in S.as.E (137) in which he lambastes scientists and university philosophers. We also see this is section 344 of GS: ‘In what way we, too, are pious’, where he says “"No doubt, that those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this "other world" - look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world, our world?".

But wait. Doesn’t section 344 also say that “it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rest… that God is truth; that truth is divine…”? Maybe what Nietzsche means then is that science is bad only on the fact that its metaphysical foundations are wrong; truth then can be found in another kind of science - maybe a science that is subjective (Tee How) and not dogmatic (Wenghong).

Evolution
"Man must from time to time believe he knows why he exists" (bold my emphasis) (GS,29)

The very thought that all our purpose in life is a self-delusionary, yet necessary is certainly mind boggling!

This is almost the same as saying that all knowledge is relative, or there is no real knowledge (a postmodernist account), but we all must believe in that there is real knowledge.

I disagree with Nietzsche's fatalism. Simply because I think we have not just evolved into 'a fantastic animal that must fufil one condition of existence more than any other animal'(29), but that we have become entirely different creatures.

Nietzsche's convictions, which seem to follow from an evolutionary account of life, are surpassed by some modern accounts of evolution that hold that cultural evolution (memes) elevates humanity unto a different plane from plainly the genetic evolution of mere animals. Coupled with truly random fluctuations at the quantum level, I believe we must reject all crude fatalistic accounts that seem to follow from evolution.

What does it take to be a True Man (superman?) ?
They are those true men, those who are no longer animal, the philosophers, artists and saints. (159)

What does it mean to be a true man? Especially, what does it mean to be a saint?

it does not matter so much the method and circumstances under which one examines (life) but that he actually does examine it. - Joyce

I think Nietzsche would disagree. He doesn't want us to just examine it, but to become something, a 'true man'. But how do you become a true person?

The Philosophy Circle
I think on behalf of Wenghong and Leon as well, I would like to invite everyone to take a look and participate in The Philosophy Circle.
For those who don't know, this is a website maintained by certain individuals in our philosophy department for our philosophy department. I might prove useful as a discussion forum for other topics of interest. For example, Leon has posted something on Tolerance. Do check it out!

The Oscillation between Christianity and Antiquity.
Pg.133. The explanation of this spiritlessness and of why all moral energy is at such a low ebb is difficult and involved; but no one who considers the influence victorious Christianity had on the morality of our ancient world can overlook the reaction of declining Christianity upon our own time. Through the exaltedness of its ideal, Christianity excelled the moral systems of antiquity and the naturalism that resided in them to such a degree that this naturalism came to excite apathy and disgust; but later on, when these better and higher ideals, though now known, proved unattainable, it was no longer possible to return to what was good and high in antique virtue, however much one might want to. It is in this oscillation between Christianity and antiquity, between an imitated or hypocritical Christian morality and an equally despondent and timid revival of antiquity, that modern man lives, and does not live very happily; the fear of what is natural he has inherited and the renewed attraction of this naturalness, the desire for a firm footing somewhere, the impotence of his knowledge that reels back and forth between the good and the better, all this engenders a restlessness, a disorder in the modern soul which condemns it to a joyless unfruitfulness.

One point which I'm currently endeavouring to understand is Nietzsche's view of "modern" day morals. First, there was the moral systems of antiquity. Then Christianity came along, and made these morals into lofty unattainable ideals. The word that I'm struggling to understand here is 'naturalism', but it caused apathy and disgust.

I think naturalism either means: "Definition 1. in literature, a method of depicting life that reflects a philosophy of determinism", or "Definition 3. in theology, the doctrine that religious truth derives from nature rather than from revelation. "

So when people became sick and tired of Christianity, they were left with either a washed down version of Christian morals, or some lousy antique moral system, which led to 'joyless unfruitfulness'.

So now, what is Nietzsche's solution to this problem? I long to find out...

Applying Philosophy to Philosopy..
I like Nietszhe's views on science as a discipline. I assume that he would be fairly against a materialistic view of the world. Science, the (arguably) most influencial force in our time, is according to Nietzsche, only 'pure knowledge' and not 'truth' (137). Being partial to science myself, I wonder what others think?

Interestingly, I also wonder what Nietzsche would think of philosopy today (or some branches of it)? Are we, like Kant, only chasing 'pure' but irrelevant knowledge? What is philosophy? Is it only about "the thrill of the hunt"? Or is it about the truth? Philosopher: "lover of wisdom". Wisdom = Truth or pure knowledge? Is there even 'truth? Is the disctinction between truth and pure knowledge tenable (or maybe ineffective ;) )?

Tee How has an excellent exposition on this topic entiled "The Deign of Subjectivity", and I agree entirely with it!

Here are some interesting philosophical questions from Nietzsche that I still don't know the answers to...

1. How can we take control (be the helmsman) of our existence? Through self-knowledge, self-enlightenment (160)? Why is this a metaphysical goal (160)? How is this the 'perfecting of nature' (160)?

2. Where does animal end and man begin? (158)

3. What is man's reason for existence? Is it for dramatic poetry (160)? The production of great men (161)?
apologies for the non-pc language;just quoting.

On Reading Nietzsche
There have been some posts recently on how hard it is to access Nietzsche's philosopy as he is so literary. Prof Holdbo has also refrained for answering how best we should approach Nietzsche. Maybe this is because there is no one way, but perhaps, sir, it would be helpful to share with us your view? Don't worry, I'm sure we'll formulate our own views and approaches as we read more of Nietzsche.

Good of you though, Tee How, to stand up for Nietzsche!

As another point, I find it more productive to read Nietzsche with a slant. Why I first voted (as 2nd spot) for Nietzsche is because he was described as developing a philosophy of morality for the atheistic modern man. Perhaps you too, by concentrating on one angle, will make things much easier and interesting. Best of luck!

...it is a painful and dangerous undertaking to thus tunnel into oneself...(UM,129)
You know, I'm curious. Painful, I'd agree, but why is it dangerous to examine who we are? So far, I think its something that everyone should do.

Ah! I found the answer from SAE (140) which gives the two dangers as isolation and despair of the truth.

p.s.Actually, as Wenghong has kindly pointed out, there is more than 2! Will write about this is another post.

Can we really break free of culture?

What does Nietzsche really mean when he says that we should 'be ourselves'?

Page 1 of Untimely Meditations: Nietzsche defintely has a bad opinion of culture. He thinks that people are being lazy in not 'being themselves', and that the ideal is the 'artist' or 'great thinker'.
Well, I think that Nietzsche is mostly right. We must not be lazy and become 'factory products'. (I know of many people that do not seriously evaluate their cultural paradigm).
But there are a lot of complexities that come into the way. Firstly, culture is not entirely bad, but not only does culture make us, but we are our culture. Can we actually break free and 'be ourselves' when perhaps all we can do is 'find' another culture to believe in? Secondly, 'the mass' is no more that identifiable. In today's terms, what is the mass? Almost everyone is thoroughly different in interests and opinions nowadays. Who are the factory products and who are not? I wonder.
Ultimately, it seems that all Nietzsche is saying to me is the same as what Socrates said all that time ago: 'the unexamined life is not worth living'.